The concept of quality of life is the basis for a new paradigm of clinical medicine. Its assessment is considered to be an important instrument in determining disease severity and effectiveness of different treatment modalities. Our studies are devoted to the problem of diabetes complications especially anemia in patients with diabetic kidney disease. Anemia in subjects with diabetic nephropathy may result from various pathogenic factors including erythropoietin deficiency, iron deficiency, vitamin B12 and/or folate deficiencies, the effects of proinflammatory cytokines etc. (...) Diabetic patients with anemia are at increased risk of cardiovascular accidents and death. The aim of this study was to assess the influence of anemia on the quality of life of patients with early stages of diabetic nephropathy. We investigated 127 patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus and early diabetic nephropathy. Anemia was defined according to the World Health Organization criteria. Anemic patients were divided into three groups according to the stage of chronic kidney disease. Patients’ quality of life was assessed with SF-36 health survey. Anemic patients had lower scores of physical role functioning and emotional role functioning as compared to the patients with normal hemoglobin level, irrespective of the stage of chronic kidney disease. Patients with anemia and chronic kidney disease stage 3 had lower scores of general health perceptions, physical functioning, bodily pain, vitality and mental health than patients in the non-anemic group. Social role functioning was similar in anemic and non-anemic patients. The possible mechanisms and implications of the above mentioned findings are discussed with a medical and humanitarian perspective. The directions of further studies are proposed. (shrink)

In a pair of very important papers, namely “Space, Time and Individuals” in the Journal of Philosophy for October 1955 and “The Indestructibility and Immutability of Substances” in Philosophical Studies for April 1956, Professor N. L. Wilson began something which badly needed beginning, namely the construction of a logically rigorous “substance-language” in which we talk about enduring and changing individuals as we do in common speech, as opposed to the “space-time” language favoured by very many mathematical logicians, perhaps most notably (...) by Quine. This enterprise of Wilson's is one with which I could hardly sympathize more heartily than I do; and one wishes for this logically rigorous “substance-language” not only when one is reading Quine but also when one is reading many other people. How fantastic it is, for instance, that Kotarbinski1 should call his metaphysics “Reism” when the very last kind of entity it has room for is things —instead of them it just has the world-lines or life-histories of things; “fourdimensional worms”, as Wilson says. Wilson, moreover, has at least one point of superiority to another rebel against space-time talk, P. F. Strawson; namely he does seriously attempt to meet formalism with formalism—to show that logical rigour is not a monopoly of the other side. At another point, however, Strawson seems to me to see further than Wilson; he is aware that substance-talk cannot be carried on without tenses, whereas Wilson tries to do without them. Wilson, in short, has indeed brought us out of Egypt; but as yet has us still wandering about the Sinai Peninsula; the Promised Land is a little further on than he has taken us. (shrink)

WHAT do we mean by saying that a being, God for example, is omniscient? One way of answering this question is to translate ‘God is omniscient’ into some slightly more formalised language than colloquial English, e.g. one with variables of a number of different types, including variables replaceable by statements, and quantifiers binding thes.

Author's answers to questions on Buddhist philosophy, posed to him by some foreign scholars.

It is frequently said that words like ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘ago’, ‘present’, ‘past’, ‘future’ and the various indications of tense, are ‘egocentric’ or ‘token-reflexive’ in character. I want to suggest, on the contrary, that the apparent egocentricity or token-reflexiveness of this class of expression is deceptive. It is perhaps not easy to see how on a point of this sort deception is possible, but a parallel case may make the position clearer.